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Real Rights of Noncompetition: Louisiana Public 
Policy and the Civil Tradition 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1985, James and Catherine Olinde, co-owners of a ten-acre tract of 
land, decided to open a restaurant.1 They set aside four acres for their new 
enterprise, Ralph & Kacoo’s Restaurant, and planned to sell the 
remainder.2 The Olindes understood, however, that when any business 
sells land there is a risk that it will fall into a competitor’s hands.3 The 
couple protected themselves from this risk by including a noncompetition 
clause in their act of sale: the land was sold to Anthony Diez on the 
condition that it could not be used for the operation of a seafood restaurant 
until 60 months after the sale.4 Shortly after the sale, Mr. Diez leased his 
new land to a third party who promptly opened a seafood restaurant, and 
the Olindes brought suit.5 This seemingly simple contract dispute belies a 
labyrinth of jurisprudence, doctrine, and law, all surrounding Louisiana’s 
real rights of noncompetition. 
States universally recognize and regulate noncompetition agreements 
to balance the needs of business with the needs of the public.6 The 
arrangements can take a direct approach by restraining a person from 
participating in commerce7 or an indirect approach by restraining the 
commercial use of a particular property.8 The latter approach often arises 
in lease agreements or sales of land.9 In many states, the breach of these 
land-restricting agreements will give rise to action against not only the 
owner who made the agreement, but also any lessees or subsequent 
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 1. R & K Bluebonnet, Inc. v. Patout’s of Baton Rouge, Inc., 521 So. 2d 634, 
635 (La. Ct. App. 1988). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id.  
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. E.g., LA. REV. STAT. § 23:921 (2017); MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-703 
(2017); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.50 (West 2015).  
 7. LA. REV. STAT. § 23:921 (permitting such agreements within certain 
constraints). 
 8. Mark S. Dennison, Lessee’s Enforcement of Covenant Prohibiting Lessor’s 
Use or Lease of Other Premises for Use in Competition With Lessee's Business, in 
95 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 467, 476 (2007). 
 9. Id. 




purchasers of the affected property.10 In Louisiana, however, it is not so 
easy to enforce these land-restricting noncompetition agreements against 
third parties.11 
This difference is due to Louisiana’s division of rights and their 
corresponding obligations into two categories: real and personal.12 Only real 
rights, such as the right of ownership,13 follow property and can be enforced 
against all third parties.14 Personal rights, such as the right to collect 
payment, follow persons and can only be enforced against third parties who 
have explicitly agreed to assume the obligation.15 The distinction between 
real and personal rights is important for businesses seeking to limit the use 
of property because it is far more effective to bind everyone who might ever 
be associated with the property than to bind only the current owner of the 
property.16 Savvy businesses, such as Ralph & Kacoo’s Restaurant,17 will 
therefore attempt to create “real rights of noncompetition”18 in their land-
use-restricting contracts. 
                                                                                                             
 10. See Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Dolgencorp, LLC, 746 F.3d 1008, 1026 
(11th Cir. 2014) (finding lease agreements between the plaintiff and various 
lessors in Florida that limited the space other tenants could use for the sale of 
groceries created rights that were enforceable against co-tenants).  
 11. See, e.g., id. Winn Dixie sued to enforce lease agreements prohibiting 
competition across several states. Id. Winn Dixie’s contracts were enforceable 
against its fellow lessors in Florida, but they were not enforceable against third 
parties in Louisiana because of Louisiana’s distinction between real and personal 
obligations. Id. at 1031.  
 12. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1763 cmt. b (2017) (stating that a real right is a 
right enforceable against the whole world rather than against a single person); id. 
art. 1763 (defining real obligations as those incidental to real rights). The terms 
“personal right” and “personal obligation” are not defined explicitly in the Code, 
but they refer to those civil rights and obligations that are not “real rights” or “real 
obligations.” See, e.g., id. art. 734 cmt. b; id. art. 1764 (establishing that personal 
obligations are transferred only by explicit assumption of the personal obligation 
by an obligor’s successor). 
 13. Id. art. 476 cmt. b. 
 14. Id. art. 1763 cmt. b (stating that a real right is a right enforceable against 
the whole world rather than against a single person); id. art. 1764 (establishing 
that real rights are transferred by transfer of an associated property). 
 15. See id. arts. 1764, 18211823; id. art. 1764 cmt. d. 
 16. This Louisiana quirk has already caused problems for at least one unwary 
business. See Winn-Dixie, 746 F.3d at 1031. 
 17. R & K Bluebonnet, Inc. v. Patout’s of Baton Rouge, Inc., 521 So. 2d 634, 
635 (La. Ct. App. 1988). See also Meadowcrest Ctr. v. Tenet Health Sys. Hosps., 
Inc., 902 So. 2d 512, 514 (La. Ct. App. 2005). 
 18. Because Louisiana calls any rights that run with property and affect third 
parties “real rights,” see LA. CIV. CODE art. 1763 cmt. b; id. art. 1764, the term 




The Louisiana Supreme Court has affirmed that land-restricting 
noncompetition agreements can create personal rights and obligations,19 but 
the Court has yet to address whether parties can create real rights of 
noncompetition.20 Other Louisiana courts have generally upheld real rights 
of noncompetition in the form of predial servitudes,21 but these decisions 
rest on cursory legal analyses that gloss over the essential elements of 
predial servitudes.22 
Predial servitudes that restrict trade can provide protection to businesses 
and encourage the sale of property, but there are two major obstacles to court 
enforcement of these servitudes. First, most predial servitudes of 
noncompetition are theoretically unsound under the Louisiana Civil Code 
and civil law doctrine.23 Second, these arrangements can permanently 
remove property from trade,24 even to the point that businesses might 
purchase their own regional monopolies given enough wealth.25 If the 
Louisiana legislature approves of real rights of noncompetition, there must 
be legislation to authorize and regulate them.26 
                                                                                                             
“real right of noncompetition” is a fitting description for the rights and obligations 
discussed in this Comment. For reasons established in Part I of this Comment, this 
term is interchangeable with “predial servitude of noncompetition.” See infra Part I. 
 19. See, e.g., Leonard v. Lavigne, 162 So. 2d 341, 343 (La. 1964). 
 20. A. N. YIANNOPOULOS, PREDIAL SERVITUDES § 6:5, in 4 LOUISIANA CIVIL 
LAW TREATISE 357 (4th ed. 2013). 
 21. E.g., Richard v. Broussard, 378 So. 2d 959, 968 (La. Ct. App. 1979); R & 
K Bluebonnet, 521 So. 2d at 635. 
 22. See infra Parts II.B.1., III.B. 
 23. See infra Part III.A. 
 24. See infra Part III.B; see also Meadowcrest Ctr. v. Tenet Health Sys. 
Hosps., Inc., 902 So. 2d 512, 514 (La. Ct. App. 2005). 
 25. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 697 (2017) (establishing that parties can contract 
to create predial servitudes upon their land or to benefit their land). Unless 
specifically excluded, things, including incorporeal property rights, may be 
bought and sold in Louisiana through contracts of sale. Id. art. 2448. Money, 
sometimes called wealth, can be used to purchase things in a contract of sale. 
Money, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1096 (9th ed. 2009); LA. CIV. CODE arts. 
2448, 2464. No language in article 697 or any other code article prohibits parties 
from granting predial servitudes on their property in exchange for money in a 
contract of sale. It follows that persons with sufficient wealth could purchase a 
large number of servitudes that restrict competition. A glut of servitudes 
precluding trade, all located within an area and benefitting the same estate, would 
make the owner of the dominant estate the only person who could operate a 
particular business in that area. 
 26. See infra Part IV.  




This Comment explores the enforceability of real rights of 
noncompetition in Louisiana. Part I provides background on Louisiana 
real rights and personal obligations. Part II examines how Louisiana courts 
have embraced certain real rights of noncompetition. Part III argues that 
Louisiana’s enthusiastic acceptance of these rights oversimplifies the law 
of real rights and ignores important public policy concerns. Part IV 
proposes a legislative solution to these problems and attempts to reconcile 
legitimate business interests with the best interests of the state. 
I. LOUISIANA RIGHTS: REAL AND PERSONAL 
Louisiana divides obligations and rights into two categories: real and 
personal.27 A real right attaches to a piece of property and grants direct 
authority over the thing;28 this authority can be enforced or asserted against 
any and all persons in the world.29 Because the real right is attached to 
property, it is automatically transferred to a successor in interest to the 
property.30 In contrast, a personal obligation conveys authority over one 
or more persons, the obligors,31 and the obligation may only ever be 
enforced or asserted against the obligors themselves.32 The transferability 
                                                                                                             
 27. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1763 (defining real obligations as those incidental 
to real rights); id. art. 1763 cmt. b (stating that a real right is a right enforceable 
against the whole world rather than against a single person); id. art. 1764 
(establishing that real rights are transferred by transfer of an associated property 
where personal obligations are transferred only by assumption of the personal 
obligation by a successor). 
 28. Id. art. 1764; id. art. 476 cmt. b. 
 29. Id. art. 1763 cmt. b. 
 30. Id. art. 1764. 
 31. Id. art. 1756. See also id. art. 476 cmt. b. The law distinguishes between 
real rights that attach to property directly and personal rights that require an 
obligor to grant a right holder access to a thing under the obligor’s control. Id. The 
latter arrangement perfectly describes lease agreements, which create personal 
rights and obligations under Louisiana law. See Richard v. Hall, 874 So. 2d 131, 
145 (La. 2004) (citing A. N. YIANNOPOULOS, PROPERTY § 226, in 2 LOUISIANA 
CIVIL LAW TREATISE 435 (4th ed. 2001)). 
 32. SPE FO Holdings, LLC v. Retif Oil & Fuel, LLC, No. 07-3779, 2008 WL 
754716, at *2 (E.D. La. Mar. 19, 2008). This rule holds true even when the obligor 
has some control over interested third parties, such as with an obligor lessor and 
the obligor’s third-party lessees. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1977; see also, e.g., 
Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Dolgencorp, LLC, 746 F.3d 1031 (11th Cir. 2014) 
(Winn Dixie, as lessee, contracted for the exclusive right to sell groceries in its 
lessor’s strip mall; this right could be asserted against the lessor but not against 




of a personal obligation depends on whether the obligation is considered 
heritable or strictly personal.33 
Real rights are subdivided into ownership, predial servitudes, personal 
servitudes, and “other real rights.”34 The concept of ownership is 
straightforward, and an owner ordinarily need not fear that his own 
property will be used in competition against him.35 The “other real rights” 
category is rarely employed in legal practice, and arguments that 
noncompetition agreements fall into this category have consistently 
failed.36 When businesses in Louisiana assert the existence of real rights 
of noncompetition, the courts focus on servitudes and confine their 
                                                                                                             
the lessor’s other lessees when these other lessees began selling groceries in the 
strip mall.). 
 33. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1764. If a personal obligation or right is strictly 
personal, it cannot be transferred. Id. art. 1766. If a personal obligation or right is 
heritable, it may be transferred to a successor by assumption of obligations, 
assignment of rights, or whatever other means the law allows. See id. art. 1765. 
 34. Id. art. 476. 
 35. Ownership is the right of direct, immediate, and exclusive authority of a 
thing. Id. art. 477. Ownership conveys full authority to use a thing, which is usus; 
to acquire its fruits, which is fructus, and to dispose of it, which is abusus. Id. It 
follows that a person who owns a thing—and thus controls its use—need not fear 
that the thing will be used in competition against the owner unless the owner sells 
or leases the property to another person. In the event of lease, a noncompetition 
agreement between lessor and lessee might be drafted, but the law will treat the 
noncompetition arrangement as a personal obligation between lessor and lessee, 
not a real right. See, e.g., Leonard v. Lavigne, 162 So. 2d 341, 343 (La. 1964). 
 36. LA. CIV. CODE art. 476 cmt. d. Louisiana “building restrictions,” 
described in articles 775 through 783, likely fall into this “other” category. 
Because of the strict requirements for their existence, which are rarely met, 
building restrictions are relevant to the current discussion only because parties 
have repeatedly and unsuccessfully classified their noncompetition arrangements 
as building restrictions to create real rights. See, e.g., Richard v. Broussard, 378 
So. 2d 959, 968 (La. Ct. App. 1979) (determining that an agreement not to use 
property for a commercial purpose created a predial servitude but not a building 
restriction); R & K Bluebonnet, Inc. v. Patout’s of Baton Rouge, Inc., 521 So. 2d 
634, 635 (La. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that an agreement not to use a property to 
operate a seafood restaurant in competition with seller of land created a predial 
servitude and not a building restriction). C.f., McGuffy v. Weil, 125 So. 2d 154, 
158 (La. 1960) (decided before codification of building restriction laws and 
holding that an agreement to use newly purchased property for only residential 
purposes created only an unclassified servitude and was enforceable as a real 
right). 




analysis there.37 It follows that predial and personal servitudes are the most 
relevant areas of law for real rights of noncompetition. 
A. Predial Servitude 
A predial servitude is a charge on one estate, the servient estate, for 
the benefit of another, the dominant estate.38 The predial servitude has 
three elements: (1) two separately owned estates; (2) a charge on the 
servient estate; (3) for the benefit of the dominant estate.39 
First, a predial servitude requires both a dominant and a servient 
estate, each separate and distinct from the other;40 for no owner may 
impose a predial servitude on a single estate for its own benefit.41 It is not 
enough for two estates to be separate from each other in location alone—
the estates must be owned by separate parties.42 A predial servitude will 
be extinguished if a single person comes to own both the servient and 
dominant estates.43 
Second, a predial servitude requires a charge on the servient estate that 
burdens the owner in some capacity.44 However, the owner of a servient 
estate is generally not required to personally do anything on his estate; 
instead, his obligation is to abstain from doing something on his estate or 
to permit something to be done on it.45 Whether the owner refrains from 
action or permits action determines the sort of predial servitude created: 
affirmative or negative.46 A predial servitude is affirmative if it gives the 
dominant estate owner the right to take action on the servient estate, such 
as the right to pass through, to lay pipe, or to use a wall for support.47 A 
predial servitude is negative if it obligates the servient estate owner to 
                                                                                                             
 37. See, e.g., Richard, 378 So. 2d at 968; R & K Bluebonnet, 521 So. 2d at 635. 
 38. LA. CIV. CODE art. 646. 
 39. Notably, no element of proximity exists. The separate estates may be any 
distance apart as long as they are close enough that the dominant estate can derive 
some benefit from the servient estate. Id. art. 648. 
 40. Id. art. 646. 
 41. Id. art. 646 cmt. f. This general principle assumes that a single person 
owns both estates; an estate over which one person has co-ownership might still 
be in a predial servitude with another estate owned in full or in part by the same 
person. Id. 
 42. Id. art. 646. 
 43. Id. art. 765 (establishing that a servitude is automatically extinguished if 
one person acquires ownership of both estates simultaneously). 
 44. Id. art. 646. 
 45. Id. art. 651. 
 46. Id. art. 706. 
 47. Id. 




refrain from doing something on his own estate such as a prohibition 
against building a dam to stop drainage.48 
Third, the charge on the servient estate must exist for the benefit of the 
dominant estate.49 This requirement, known as the principle of utility,50 
limits predial servitudes to charges that can reasonably be expected to 
benefit the dominant estate.51 A valid predial servitude will encumber the 
servient estate for the benefit of the person who, at any given time, owns 
the dominant estate.52 A predial servitude is inseparable from the dominant 
estate and will pass with it when the property is sold or donated to another 
person; similarly, the charges on a servient estate will pass with the land 
to any future owners.53 This principle is in accordance with the general 
requirement that real rights and obligations automatically transfer to a 
person who acquires the movable or immovable thing to which the right 
or obligation is attached.54 
B. Personal Servitude 
A personal servitude is a charge on a thing for the benefit of a person, 
the beneficiary.55 Personal servitudes are subdivided into usufruct, 
habitation, and right of use.56 The right of use, sometimes called a “limited 
personal servitude,” confers upon a person some specified use of an estate 
less than full enjoyment; the conferred advantage must be one that could 
be established by a predial servitude.57 The limited personal servitude is 
frequently compared to the predial servitude58 and is governed by the same 
                                                                                                             
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. art. 647. 
 50. Id. art. 647 cmt. b. 
 51. Id. art. 647. 
 52. Id. art. 647 cmt. c. 
 53. Id. art. 650. 
 54. Id. art. 1764. 
 55. Id. art. 534. 
 56. The personal servitudes permitted by the Civil Code include usufruct 
(where the beneficiary enjoys the use and fruits of a thing), id. arts. 538539; 
habitation (where the beneficiary enjoys the right to live in the home of another), 
id. art. 647; and right of use (where the beneficiary enjoys the use of an estate 
whether in part or in whole), id. art. 639. Of these, habitation and usufruct are 
irrelevant to noncompetition agreements because they do not place charges on an 
estate for the benefit of someone other than an inhabitant or possessor 
respectively. 
 57. Id. arts. 639–640; id. art. 639 cmt. c. 
 58. See, e.g., Ritter v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., No. 12 CA 1654, 
2013 WL 4080914, at *3 (La. Ct. App. Aug. 13, 2013), writ denied, 130 So. 3d 




laws as predial servitudes wherever the rules are applicable.59 Like a predial 
servitude, a limited personal servitude is a real right and will continue to 
burden the servient estate even if that property is transferred.60 The key 
distinction is that the beneficiary of a limited personal servitude is a person 
rather than a separate estate.61 The beneficiary does not automatically 
transfer the real right when he transfers his own property; instead, the right 
attaches to his person and follows him until he transfers the right to his heirs 
or successors.62 A personal servitude, like a predial servitude, is heritable, 
but it is transferred separately from the beneficiary’s estate.63 
The personal and predial servitude are also distinguished by the nature 
of the obligations that can be imposed on the servient estate owner. A predial 
servitude may require the owner of a servient estate either to refrain from 
taking certain actions on the servient estate or to permit certain actions on 
the servient estate by the owner of the dominant estate.64 A limited personal 
servitude, however, encompasses only those arrangements where the 
                                                                                                             
945 (La. 2014) (“[A] personal servitude is a charge on a thing for the benefit of a 
person, while a predial servitude is a charge on an estate expressly for the benefit 
of another estate.”); LA. CIV. CODE art. 639 cmt. b (“The personal servitude of 
right of use confers advantages less than full enjoyment of an estate. In this 
respect, it resembles a predial servitude.”). 
 59. LA. CIV. CODE art. 645.  
 60. Id.; see also id. art. 650. Personal servitudes are governed by the law of 
predial servitudes where applicable, and so personal servitudes are subject to the 
same limitations of inseparability from the servient estate as predial servitudes 
with the distinction that a person, instead of a dominant estate, benefits from the 
burden that follows the servient estate. Id.  
 61. Id. arts. 534, 639, 646; Richard v. Hall, 874 So. 2d 131, 145 (La. 2004) 
(“[T]he qualification of a servitude as ‘personal’ indicates that the servitude is in 
favor of a person rather than an estate.” (citing A. N. YIANNOPOULOS, PERSONAL 
SERVITUDES § 223, in 3 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE (4th ed. 2000)). 
 62. Richard, 874 So. 2d at 145. “One practical distinction between the two 
kinds of servitudes is that predial servitudes pass with transfers of the servient 
estate while personal servitudes do not inure to the benefit of transferees of the 
land owned by the person in whose favor the servitude was established.” Guillotte 
v. Wells, 485 So. 2d 187, 189 (La. Ct. App. 1986). 
 63. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 643644. This quality of separate transfer will not 
necessarily make the duration of a personal servitude longer or shorter than that of 
a predial servitude; either might be extinguished by convention, by destruction of 
the servient estate, or by prescription for nonuse by the beneficiary. See id. arts. 645, 
751, 753, 771, 773. A servitude of either sort will also be extinguished by the 
dissolution of the right of the person who initially granted the servitude. Id. art. 774. 
 64. Id. art. 651. 




servient estate owner is required to permit actions by the beneficiary.65 
Indeed, courts have not interpreted agreements that obligate landowners 
not to do something on their estate or not to build something on their estate 
as limited personal servitudes.66 Instead, any attempt to bind a landowner 
not to use his property in a particular manner for the benefit of a person 
rather than an estate will create only a personal obligation, not a real 
obligation.67 
C. Personal Obligations 
If parties are unable or unwilling to establish real rights of 
noncompetition, they might elect to contract for personal obligations that 
bind persons not to take certain actions on their own property.68 Generally 
defined, a personal obligation is a legal relationship whereby a person, 
called the obligor, is bound to render a performance in favor of another 
person, called the obligee.69 This performance may consist of giving, 
                                                                                                             
 65. See id. art. 639 cmt. c. This quality makes the limited personal servitude 
similar to the affirmative predial servitudes, where the owner of the servient estate 
must permit others to make use of the property. This parallel makes sense when 
considering the limited personal servitude’s other name, the right of use. But see 
id. art 640 cmt. b (asserting that the right of view, which necessarily obliges the 
servient estate owner not to build something on his estate, can be granted in the 
form of a personal servitude). Article 640 itself stipulates that “the right of use 
may confer only an advantage that may be established by a predial servitude.” 
Comment b infers from this language that every advantage which can be 
established by predial servitude can also be conferred by a right of use, but this 
inference is unfounded. A rule stating that all of category A must also be in 
category B does not imply a rule that all of category B must also be in category 
A; it is entirely possible that one category is broader than another. 
 66. See YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 20, § 6:5 (citing Leonard v. Lavigne, 162 
So. 2d 341, 343 (La. 1964), which held that an agreement by a landowner that he 
and his heirs and assigns would not operate a business in competition with a 
lessee’s created a mere personal obligation rather than a real obligation); Mardis 
v. Brantley, 717 So. 2d 702, 704 (La. Ct. App. 1998), writ denied, 729 So. 2d 563 
(La. 1998) (stating that an agreement not to build upon land or use it for a 
particular purpose creates either a predial servitude or a personal obligation 
depending on whether it benefits an estate or a person). 
 67. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1764 (referencing personal obligations as an 
alternative to real obligations in the law).  
 68. See, e.g., Leonard v. Lavigne, 162 So. 2d 341, 343 (La. 1964) 
(determining that an agreement that lessors neither operate a business in 
competition with their lessee nor lease other land to people who would compete 
with the lessee created a personal obligation). 
 69. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1756. 




doing, or not doing something.70 Personal obligations arise from a variety 
of sources, including lawful contracts between persons.71 
In Louisiana, parties can contract for any lawful object that does not 
contravene legislation or public policy.72 Noncompetition agreements and 
their associated obligations are lawful objects for contracts, but these 
contracts are heavily restricted by legislation.73 However, this legislation 
only limits noncompetition agreements affecting employees, franchise 
owners, partners in business, and purchasers of a business’s goodwill.74 
The legislation is geared toward regulating employment and does not 
regulate contracts between parties on equal footing, such as competing 
businesses.75 Indeed, Louisiana jurisprudence indicates that neither public 
policy nor legislation bars contracts between landowners that create mere 
personal obligations not to use land in competition with another party.76 
                                                                                                             
 70. Id.  
 71. Id. art. 1757. 
 72. Id. art. 1971. 
 73. See LA. REV. STAT. § 23:921 (2017).  
 74. Id. 
 75. The Louisiana Supreme Court has determined that the statute does not 
apply to agreements between businesses on equal footing. Louisiana Smoked 
Prods., Inc. v. Savoie’s Sausage & Food Prods., Inc., 696 So. 2d 1373, 137881 
(La. 1997). The Court based its holding on the fact that the statute is placed next 
to laws governing employment, on indications that the legislature was concerned 
with employee abuse when it wrote the statutory language, and on the fact that the 
statute offers exceptions allowing noncompetition arrangements for employees 
when restrictions are met but not for other parties that would need less protection 
than employees. Id. The Louisiana Fifth Circuit reaffirmed the Louisiana Supreme 
Court’s interpretation and declined to apply the statute to prohibit a predial 
servitude of noncompetition between two businesses acting as parties in the sale 
of land. Meadowcrest Ctr. v. Tenet Health Sys. Hosps., Inc., 902 So. 2d 512, 515 
(La. Ct. App. 2005). This interpretation appears to be the usual one by the courts 
even though real rights of noncompetition carry risks beyond personal obligations 
owing to their longevity. See, e.g., R & K Bluebonnet, Inc. v. Patout’s of Baton 
Rouge, Inc., 521 So. 2d 634, 635 (La. Ct. App. 1988); Richard v. Broussard, 378 
So. 2d 959, 968 (La. Ct. App. 1979). In both of these cases, the court found predial 
servitudes of noncompetition and did not discuss statutory prohibitions against 
noncompetition agreements. Id.  
 76. See, e.g., SPE FO Holdings, LLC v. Retif Oil & Fuel, LLC, No. 07-3779, 
2008 WL 754716 (E.D. La. Mar. 19, 2008) (making no mention of this statute 
when declaring such an arrangement a personal obligation). Neither has public 
policy been a bar to such arrangements before legislation. See, e.g., Leonard v. 
Lavigne, 162 So. 2d 341, 343 (La. 1964) (allowing a personal right of 
noncompetition to exist between a lessor and lessee). 




A personal obligation not to use land to compete in a business or trade 
provides the beneficiary, the obligee, with fewer benefits than would a real 
obligation of noncompetition. When a business must rely on an obligor’s 
lessees or successors to explicitly assume an obligation of noncompetition, 
there is little long-term security in the arrangement. Because real rights run 
with the land and are automatically enforceable against subsequent purchasers 
or lessees,77 they are a more desirable option for businesses that wish to 
restrain the use of another party’s land.78 Parties cannot create personal 
servitudes that bind a landowner not to use his property in a particular manner, 
so businesses that seek real rights of noncompetition must contract for predial 
servitudes.79 The jurisprudence illustrates the popularity of such predial 
servitudes of noncompetition among Louisiana businesses.80 
II. THE CURRENT LOUISIANA APPROACH TO 
REAL RIGHTS OF NONCOMPETITION 
Because Louisiana real rights pass to new parties without requiring an 
explicit assumption of rights,81 businesses occasionally contract for real rights 
of noncompetition.82 The noncompetition agreements are sometimes included 
in lease contracts,83 in acts of sale of land,84 or in the sale of a business in 
                                                                                                             
 77. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1764. 
 78. See, e.g., R & K Bluebonnet, 521 So. 2d at 635 (parties agreed that 
purchased property would not be used as a seafood restaurant); SPE FO Holdings, 
2008 WL 754716, at *1 (parties agreed as part of a sale of assets that a plot of 
land owned by the seller would not be used to compete with the purchaser in the 
sale of fuel). 
 79. See supra Part I.AB. 
 80. See, e.g., R & K Bluebonnet, 521 So. 2d at 635 (parties agreed that 
purchased property would not be used as a seafood restaurant); SPE FO Holdings, 
2008 WL 754716, at *1 (parties agreed as part of a sale of assets that a plot of 
land owned by the seller would not be used to compete with the purchaser in the 
sale of fuel). 
 81. See supra Part I. 
 82. See, e.g., R & K Bluebonnet, 521 So. 2d at 635 (parties agreed that 
purchased property would not be used as a seafood restaurant); SPE FO Holdings, 
2008 WL 754716, at *1 (parties agreed as part of a sale of assets that a plot of 
land owned by the seller would not be used to compete with the purchaser in the 
sale of fuel). 
 83. E.g., Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Dolgencorp, LLC, 746 F.3d 1008 (11th 
Cir. 2014) (lawsuit to enforce lease agreements prohibiting competition across 
several states). 
 84. E.g., R & K Bluebonnet, 521 So. 2d at 635 (parties agreed that purchased 
property would not be used as a seafood restaurant). 




which one party seeks assurance that the lands of the other will not be used 
against them.85 Louisiana jurisprudence has been fairly supportive of these 
agreements,86 except when they are embedded in lease contracts.87 
A. The Unenforceability of Real Rights of Noncompetition Embedded in 
Lease Agreements 
Across the various states, parties contract for lease agreements that 
limit the lessor’s use of his remaining property so that it cannot be used, 
leased, or sold in a way that would compete with the lessee’s business 
interests.88 In most common law states, this lease stipulation creates a right 
that can be enforced not only against the lessor but also against third 
parties, such as fellow lessees, who have an interest in the property as long 
as these parties were aware of the lease restriction before acquiring their 
interest in the property.89  
However, Louisiana courts have long classified leases as contracts 
establishing only personal rights and obligations.90 As part of the lease 
arrangement, an embedded noncompetition agreement that limits the use of 
the lessor’s land is also considered a personal obligation91 even when the 
parties express their intent that the obligation should automatically bind the 
“heirs and assigns” of the lessor.92 This classification as a personal obligation 
means that these noncompetition agreements, always enforceable against the 
                                                                                                             
 85. See, e.g., SPE FO Holdings, 2008 WL 754716, at *1 (parties agreed as 
part of a sale of assets that a plot of land owned by the seller would not be used to 
compete with the purchaser in the sale of fuel).  
 86. E.g., R & K Bluebonnet, 521 So. 2d at 635; Meadowcrest Ctr. v. Tenet 
Health Sys. Hosps., Inc., 902 So. 2d 512, 514 (La. Ct. App. 2005). 
 87. Leonard v. Lavigne, 162 So. 2d 341, 34243 (La. 1964); Winn-Dixie, 746 
F.3d at 1031. 
 88. See, e.g., Leonard, 162 So. 2d at 343; Winn-Dixie, 746 F.3d at 1015 
(establishing that Winn Dixie has made such leasing agreements for most of its 
approximately 500 stores across various states). 
 89. Leonard, 162 So. 2d at 342 (illustrating that Florida courts adopt this 
approach); Winn-Dixie, 746 F.3d at 1033 (explaining that the Florida approach is 
the common law norm). 
 90. Richard v. Hall, 874 So. 2d 131, 145 (La. 2004) (citing A. N. 
YIANNOPOULOS, PROPERTY § 226, in 2 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE (4th ed. 
2001)). 
 91. Leonard, 162 So. 2d at 34243; Winn-Dixie, 746 F.3d at 1031. 
 92. Leonard, 162 So. 2d at 342–43. The mention of “heirs and assigns” 
demonstrates the parties’ intent to create a real right, one that would bind future 
third parties to the contract without requiring the third parties’ explicit assumption 
of the lessor’s obligations. The Court deemed this arrangement invalid. Id. at 343. 




landowner who signed the contract, are not ordinarily enforceable against 
third parties, such as future owners of the property or fellow lessees.93 
Third parties will be bound only if they expressly assume, in writing, the 
obligations of the original obligor, the owner of the land.94 
B. The Predial Servitude: Validated Real Rights of Noncompetition  
The Louisiana Supreme Court has not yet addressed whether a predial 
servitude of noncompetition is enforceable. Indeed, the only time that the 
Court has addressed real rights of noncompetition was when it held that 
lease agreements with embedded noncompetition clauses could not create 
real rights because lease contracts place burdens on the lessors, and not 
their estates.95 Louisiana lower courts, on the other hand, have regularly 
enforced predial servitudes of noncompetition that accompany the sale of 
land or the sale of a business.96 Despite the apparent pattern, there is no 
evidence to suggest that the courts consider the sale of land or business to 
                                                                                                             
 93. E.g., Leonard, 162 So. 2d at 343; Winn-Dixie, 746 F.3d at 1031. 
Louisiana is not the only state that does not allow land restrictions in lease 
agreements to be enforced against third parties. Mississippi, at least, requires 
privity of estate between parties for enforcement of contractual obligations. Id. at 
1031. Such privity is found between a lessor and his lessee but is not found 
between lessees that share a lessor. Id. at 1032. In this sense, Mississippi law 
would achieve the same result as Louisiana law: the lessee who wishes to enforce 
his right can pursue the lessor but not third parties such as fellow lessees. This 
similarity shows that although Louisiana law is uniquely civilian in its 
classification of rights, the treatment of these restrictive covenants is not wholly 
foreign to businesses operating among the various states. 
 94. See SPE FO Holdings, LLC v. Retif Oil & Fuel, LLC, No. 07-3779, 2008 
WL 754716, at *5 (E.D. La. Mar. 19, 2008) (the existence of an enforceable 
obligation depended on whether a personal obligation survived a mortgage 
foreclosure and was assumed by purchasers of property); id. at *3 (reaffirming the 
earlier court determination and finding that assumption of obligations must be 
expressly made in writing). The Civil Code provides the legislative rules regarding 
assumption of obligations in Louisiana. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 182124 (2017). 
 95. Leonard, 162 So. 2d at 343. The Court interpreted a lease agreement that 
purportedly established a real right prohibiting a lessor’s land from being used in 
competition with one of his lessee’s business. Id. The Court found that a lease 
arrangement places burdens only on persons and not on their estates; accordingly, 
the Court held that the lease agreement could not create a real right. Id.  
 96. E.g., R & K Bluebonnet, Inc. v. Patout’s of Baton Rouge, Inc., 521 So. 
2d 634, 635 (La. Ct. App. 1988); Meadowcrest Ctr. v. Tenet Health Sys. Hosps., 
Inc. 902 So. 2d 512, 514 (La. Ct. App. 2005). 




be a prerequisite for the existence of these servitudes; rather, it is by mere 
coincidence that the cases have involved such sales.97 
1. Lower Court Endorsement of Real Rights of Noncompetition 
In R & K Bluebonnet, Inc. v. Patout’s of Baton Rouge, Inc., the Louisiana 
Second Circuit Court of Appeal held that an act of sale stipulating that the 
property sold would not be used for the operation of a seafood restaurant in 
competition with the seller’s business had created a predial servitude.98 The 
seller, owner of a ten-acre tract of land, sold part of his tract and retained the 
remainder to operate a seafood restaurant.99 The act of sale included a 
provision prohibiting the purchased property from hosting a seafood 
restaurant for 60 months after the sale.100 The parties explicitly agreed that 
the obligation would serve as a “building restriction” on the land.101 The 
court determined that the agreement was not a “building restriction,” but 
an enforceable predial servitude.102 The court noted that the act of sale 
created two estates and that the arrangement was “meant” to burden the 
restricted property for the benefit of the seller’s remaining property, the 
dominant estate.103 Satisfied with this solution, the court did not examine 
whether noncompetition benefitted the dominant estate; it was merely 
assumed. 
In Richard v. Broussard, the Louisiana Third Circuit determined that 
an arrangement in an act of sale that restricted the use of the property to 
only residential purposes had created a predial servitude despite the 
                                                                                                             
 97. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 654 (establishing that conventional predial 
servitudes can be created by juridical act without requiring that act to be a contract 
of sale). One explanation for the jurisprudential pattern is that the business 
contracts creating predial servitudes of noncompetition are more likely to be 
drafted alongside the sale of land or business assets and so more likely to be 
adjudicated under these circumstances. 
 98. R & K Bluebonnet, 521 So. 2d 634, 635 (La. Ct. App. 1988). 
 99. Id. at 635. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. The term “building restriction” refers to a particular form of real right 
in which a party might break up an estate and place upon it rules of use according 
to a development plan. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 775783. Building restrictions do not 
exist in the absence of a general plan of development that affects several estates 
together. R & K Bluebonnet, 521 So. 2d at 635. 
 102. R & K Bluebonnet, 521 So. 2d at 635. 
 103. Id. The court made no distinction between the seller’s business and his 
estate as the thing benefitting from noncompetition. 




parties’ beliefs that the arrangement was a building restriction.104 The court 
found that the seller had sold only part of his estate, thus creating two 
separately owned estates, and that the restriction placed on the encumbered 
servient estate benefitted the seller’s dominant estate.105 The court did not 
explain how the restrictions on the servient estate benefited the dominant 
estate; the court merely assumed this element.  
In Meadowcrest Center. v. Tenet Health System Hospitals, Inc., the 
Louisiana Fifth Circuit found a predial servitude of noncompetition when 
parties to a sale of land agreed that the buyer’s land would not be used to 
operate a medical facility in competition with the seller’s own.106 The 
seller—a hospital looking to unload extra property—and the buyer agreed 
that the sold property would not be used for “an outpatient surgical center 
or a diagnostic center or any similar facility” unless the buyer obtained 
permission from the seller or its successors or assigns.107 The court found 
that the arrangement burdened the servient estate by obligating the owner to 
refrain from taking action on his own property, and the court called this 
restriction “precisely the kind of restriction contemplated” in Louisiana 
Civil Code article 706.108 In accordance with the jurisprudential trend, the 
court did not discuss how the restriction benefitted the dominant estate. 
In Textron Fin. Corp. v. Retif Oil & Fuel LLC, the U.S. Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals determined that a predial servitude was not created when 
the parties to a sale of business assets agreed that the seller’s estate would 
not be used to compete with the buyer’s operations in the same parish.109 
The parties had agreed that only the buyer and his corporate successors 
would have the right to enforce the noncompetition agreement, and the 
agreement was to run as long as the buyer operated his business anywhere 
in the parish.110 Because the agreement would benefit the buyer, even if he 
                                                                                                             
 104. 378 So. 2d 959, 968 (La. Ct. App. 1979). The opinion in this case gives 
no indication that the residential requirement was meant to prohibit competition 
with the seller; instead the seller sought to restrict the property to residential use 
for some purpose of his own. Id. Still, the instance is close enough to 
noncompetition insofar as one servient estate is prohibited from participating in 
trade while the dominant estate could be put to trade without fear of competition 
from the servient estate. 
 105. Id. 
 106. 902 So. 2d 512, 514 (La. Ct. App. 2005). 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. 342 F. App’x 29, 33 (5th Cir. 2009). 
 110. Id. at 34. According to this arrangement, the buyer could move his 
business onto another estate within the parish and still enforce the noncompetition 
agreement even if he had disposed of the estate on which his business originally 
stood. Id.  




relocated his business to another property, the court held that the agreement 
did not identify a dominant estate and thus was a personal obligation rather 
than a predial servitude.111 The court did not object, however, to the theoretical 
existence of a predial servitude of noncompetition should a dominant estate 
be named. 
The overwhelming trend in the jurisprudence is that Louisiana courts 
uphold and enforce predial servitudes of noncompetition without much 
scrutiny. The courts tend to focus their analysis on whether the contracts in 
question adequately identify a servient and dominant estate, and almost no 
analysis is dedicated to the other elements of a predial servitude. Of particular 
concern, Louisiana jurisprudence has not explored whether prohibitions on 
trade can truly benefit a dominate estate; instead the courts operate as if this 
necessary element is always satisfied. This trend against heavy scrutiny of 
purported servitudes has seen Louisiana courts vastly oversimplify 
important questions of law and fact.112  
2. The One Court in Opposition 
At least one exception to this strong line of jurisprudence exists, albeit 
in the form of dicta from a federal district court. In SPE FO Holdings, LLC 
v. Retif Oil & Fuel, LLC, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of 
Louisiana determined that a valid predial servitude was not created when 
parties to a sale of business assets agreed that the seller would not use his 
estate to compete with the buyer’s business of selling gas.113 The 
arrangement was to last as long as the buyer operated his business in the 
parish, whether on the purchased property or elsewhere.114 Accordingly, the 
court held that while the “Building and Ownership Restrictions” 
arrangement between the parties specified a servient estate in the form of 
the seller’s property, it did not specify a dominant estate and so could not 
form a predial servitude.115 The court went further, however, by outright 
rejecting the viability of predial servitudes of noncompetition: “While 
reasonable restraints on competition may establish personal obligations 
between the contracting parties, prohibitions against competition may not 
constitute real rights in Louisiana.”116  
                                                                                                             
 111. Id. 
 112. See infra Part III.B. 
 113. SPE FO Holdings, LLC v. Retif Oil & Fuel, LLC, No. 07-3779, 2008 WL 
754716, at *1 (E.D. La. Mar. 19, 2008). 
 114. Id. at *3. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at *4. 




The jurisprudential authority that the court relied on does not actually 
support the court’s assertions,117 but the court’s bias against predial 
servitudes of noncompetition has at least some doctrinal support.118 Based 
on Louisiana’s public policy against land encumbrances and 
noncompetition agreements, the SPE court was right to be critical of 
predial servitudes of noncompetition.119 Based on the requirements for a 
valid predial servitude, however, the court was wrong to declare that 
predial servitudes of noncompetition can never exist under Louisiana law; 
the correct analysis sits between the federal court’s blanket rejection and 
the Louisiana courts’ blanket support for these servitudes.120 
III. LOUISIANA’S JURISPRUDENCE CHALLENGES 
PUBLIC POLICY AND LEGISLATION 
Predial servitudes of noncompetition face two major obstacles to 
legitimacy. First, the underlying noncompetition agreements only 
sometimes create a benefit for the dominant estate; this inconsistency is 
especially problematic in light of Louisiana’s public policy for strict 
interpretation and harsh scrutiny of predial servitudes. Second, predial 
servitudes of noncompetition clash with Louisiana’s strong public policy 
against noncompetition agreements. These issues cast doubt upon a line of 
jurisprudence that has casually validated predial servitudes of 
noncompetition without heavy scrutiny. 
A. Louisiana’s Public Policy Against Predial Servitudes and 
Noncompete Agreements 
Louisiana courts have found that predial servitudes are derogations 
against public policy by their very nature.121 Meanwhile, Louisiana 
legislation makes clear that land encumbrances122 and noncompetition 
                                                                                                             
 117. The court cited to Leonard v. Lavigne, 162 So. 2d 341 (La. 1964) and 
Soho Serve Corp. v. Westowne Ass’n, 929 F.2d 160 (5th Cir. 1991). SPE FO 
Holdings, LLC v. Retif Oil & Fuel, LLC, No. 07-3779, 2008 WL 754716, at *4 
(E.D. La. Mar. 19, 2008). Unfortunately, the cases cited do not address whether 
noncompetition rights can ever form real rights in Louisiana; instead, the cases 
deal with issues of lease agreements and whether leases in Louisiana create real 
or personal obligations.  
 118. See A. N. YIANNOPOULOS, PROPERTY § 227, in 2 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW 
TREATISE (4th ed. 2001); YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 20, § 6:5. 
 119. See infra Part III. 
 120. See infra Part III.B.3. 
 121. Palomeque v. Prudhomme, 664 So. 2d 88, 93 (La. 1995). 
 122. See infra Part III.A.2. 




agreements123 are disfavored under the law. Predial servitudes of 
noncompetition encumber the land and restrict trade. Therefore, courts 
should use extreme caution as they apply the law and decide whether or 
not to enforce these arrangements. Clearly, Louisiana courts have been too 
rash in their treatment of real rights of noncompetition;124 and a closer 
inspection of such arrangements is required. 
1. Jurisprudential Presumptions Against Predial Servitudes 
Louisiana public policy favors the free use of land, and the courts 
evaluate supposed servitudes under heavy scrutiny lest land be 
encumbered—perhaps permanently.125 The Louisiana Supreme Court 
declared that predial servitudes are in “derogation of public policy” and 
“not entitled to be viewed with favor by the law” because they form 
restraints on the free disposal and use of property.126 The Court interprets 
any contract for the creation of servitudes in favor of unencumbered 
ownership and the free and exclusive enjoyment of property rights;127 any 
doubt regarding the existence or extent of a predial servitude is resolved 
in favor of the servient estate.128 Lower courts have consistently found that 
this public policy requires strict interpretation that presumes the 
nonexistence of the servitude.129 Consequently, the elements of a predial 
servitude should be examined with a critical eye. 
2. Legislative Presumptions Against Encumbrances of Land 
Beyond the jurisprudentially stated public policies, the Louisiana Civil 
Code explicitly favors the free use of land and disfavors real obligations 
that restrain it. For example, predial servitudes that are not readily apparent 
to third parties can only be created by written title,130 and the title must be 
                                                                                                             
 123. E.g., LA. REV. STAT. § 23:921 (2017). 
 124. See surpa Part II.B.1. 
 125. Palomeque, 664 So. 2d at 93. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Parish v. Municipality No. 2, 8 La. Ann. 145, 152 (1853); Leonard v. 
Lavigne, 162 So. 2d 341, 343 (La. 1964). 
 128. Palomeque, 664 So. 2d at 93. 
 129. Textron Fin. Corp. v. Retif Oil & Fuel LLC, 342 F. App’x 29, 33 (5th 
Cir. 2009); Griffith v. Cathey, 762 So. 2d 29, 34 (La. Ct. App. 2000), writ denied, 
771 So. 2d 85 (La. 2000); SPE FO Holdings, LLC v. Retif Oil & Fuel, LLC, No. 
07-3779, 2008 WL 754716, at *2 (E.D. La. Mar. 19, 2008). 
 130. LA. CIV. CODE art. 739 (2017). For example, noncompetition predial 
servitudes would qualify as non-apparent servitudes because they do not produce 




recorded to affect third parties to the contract.131 By imposing such 
onerous conditions for the creation and enforcement of servitudes, the 
legislature makes clear that land should be unburdened unless parties 
fulfill the particular requirements to make it otherwise. 
Further direct bias against predial servitudes is found in Louisiana 
Civil Code articles 730 through 734.132 Indeed, article 730 makes clear that 
courts should start by presuming that servitudes do not exist: “Doubt as to 
the existence, extent, or manner of exercise of a predial servitude shall be 
resolved in favor of the servient estate.”133 However, this harsh legislative 
scrutiny does not mean that parties must express certain magic words in 
their contracts to create predial servitudes.134 Louisiana Civil Code article 
731 notes: “A charge established on an estate expressly for the benefit of 
another estate is a predial servitude although it is not so designated.”135 
Emphasizing caution136 and scrutiny rather than deference to the labels 
used by the parties,137 the legislation and public policy behind predial 
servitudes require that the courts avoid enforcing predial servitudes unless 
the law and facts unambiguously support their existence. This legislative 
truth applies with even more force to predial servitudes of noncompetition 
because of the strong public policy against restrictions of trade.138 
3. The Public Policy Against Noncompetition Agreements 
Noncompetition agreements are heavily regulated by legislation in 
various states.139 For many states, the default position is that such 
arrangements are not enforceable unless they fall into certain narrowly 
defined exceptions.140 Louisiana falls into this category of states and bars 
                                                                                                             
apparent physical effects on the estate that would indicate the servitude’s 
existence to outsiders. 
 131. The establishment of predial servitudes is subject to the laws on alienation 
of immovables. Id. art. 708. Sales of immovables occur either by an act under 
private signature or an authentic act. Id. art. 2440. Transfers of immovables must 
be filed in the parish registry to affect third parties. Id. art. 517. 
 132. See id. arts. 730734. 
 133. Id. art. 730. 
 134. Id. art. 731. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. art. 730. 
 137. Id. art. 731. 
 138. See supra Part III.A.3. 
 139. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. § 23:921 (2017); MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-703 
(2017); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.50 (West 2015). 
 140. For example, California, Montana, North Dakota, and Oklahoma bar the 
use of noncompetition agreements except as between partners in a dissolved 




noncompetition agreements except in narrow circumstances.141 The statute 
governing noncompetition agreements states: 
Every contract or agreement, or provision thereof, by which 
anyone is restrained from exercising a lawful profession, trade, or 
business of any kind, except as provided in this Section, shall be 
null and void. However, every contract or agreement, or provision 
thereof, which meets the exceptions as provided in this Section, 
shall be enforceable.142 
The exceptions contained in the statute involve contracts for employment 
relationships, the sale of a business’s goodwill, business partnerships, and 
franchise.143 In each case, save the franchise exception, the agreements are 
limited to a term of two years and to particular parishes specified in the 
contracts.144 These contracts also terminate once the obligee ceases to engage 
in the protected business or industry.145 Louisiana law does not permit 
contracts that eternally bar a person from practicing a trade or from practicing 
anywhere in the world. 
Louisiana’s general legislative prohibition of noncompetition agreements 
does not directly bar real rights of noncompetition.146 Nevertheless, the statute 
demonstrates that Louisiana greatly disfavors noncompetition arrangements, 
much as it disfavors land restrictions, and these agreements are tested under 
heavy scrutiny.147 
                                                                                                             
partnership or between the seller and purchaser of a company and its goodwill. 
See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 2017); MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-
703; N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 9-08-06 (West 2017); OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 217 
(2017). C.f., TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.50 (allowing such agreements 
when they are part of an otherwise enforceable agreement and “to the extent that 
it contains limitations as to time, geographical area, and scope of activity to be 
restrained that are reasonable and do not impose a greater restraint than is 
necessary to protect the goodwill or other business interest of the promise”). 
 141. LA. REV. STAT. § 23:921. Establishing a contract of noncompetition is 
possible only if the parties have engaged in the sale of a business’s goodwill, they 
were partners in business, there was a franchise relationship, or there was an 
employment or contractor relationship between the parties. Id. These agreements 
cannot last more than two years and are limited in their geographic scope. Id. 
 142. Id. (emphasis added).  
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. See discussion supra note 75. 
 147. See Desselle v. Petrossi, 207 So. 2d 190, 192 (La. Ct. App. 1968) 
(upholding a restriction on competition after a sale of a business and its goodwill). 




Because of Louisiana’s strong public policy against encumbrances on 
land, against the existence of predial servitudes, and against noncompetition 
agreements, courts should be cautious in enforcing an agreement that contains 
elements of both predial servitudes and noncompetition agreements. In this 
respect, the courts have failed because they almost always assume that predial 
servitudes of noncompetition are valid under Louisiana law without giving 
adequate analysis to whether the necessary elements of a predial servitude are 
satisfied.148 
B. Difficulty Meeting the Elements of Predial Servitude 
Predial servitudes must satisfy three criteria: (1) two separately owned 
estates; (2) one servient and burdened; (3) for the benefit of the 
dominant.149 Of the three essential criteria for predial servitudes, the one 
least addressed by courts is the benefit to the dominant estate.150 It is not 
difficult for parties to identify two separately owned estates or to place a 
burden of noncompetition on one of them, but a close analysis reveals that 
it is not so easy to demonstrate a benefit to the dominant estate.151 
Indeed, a predial servitude of noncompetition will only benefit a 
dominant estate when the dominant estate has been so altered or improved 
that future owners will, more likely than not, use the land for the same 
purpose as the owner who contracted for the predial servitude.152 
1. The Benefit to the Dominant Estate Defined 
Article 647 makes clear that to create a predial servitude, “there must 
be a benefit to the dominant estate. . . . There is no predial servitude if the 
charge imposed cannot be reasonably expected to benefit the dominant 
estate.”153 This simple language belies a complex requirement. 
The greatest difficulty for the creation of any predial servitude is 
ensuring that the burden on the servient estate benefits a dominant estate 
                                                                                                             
 148. See supra Part II.B.1; c.f. SPE FO Holdings, LLC v. Retif Oil & Fuel, 
LLC, No. 07-3779, 2008 WL 754716, at *1 (E.D. La. Mar. 19, 2008) (holding 
that a predial servitude of noncompetition could not be enforced because there 
was no benefit to a dominant estate). 
 149. See supra Part I.A. 
 150. See supra Part II. 
 151. See infra Part III.B.13. 
 152. See infra Part III.B. 
 153. LA. CIV. CODE art. 647 (2017). 




and not merely a person.154 This problem arises when the parties have 
created an obligation that could benefit either a person or an estate without 
identifying either as the beneficiary or when parties have created an 
obligation that cannot benefit a dominant estate at all. In the former case, 
in which parties are merely vague in their intentions, the Louisiana Civil 
Code instructs courts to apply specific rules of contract interpretation.155 
In the latter case, where parties have contracted for a right that cannot 
benefit a dominant estate, the contract cannot be enforced as a predial 
servitude.156 
The line between rights that can benefit a dominant estate and those 
that cannot is unclear. The Civil Code does not define what constitutes a 
benefit to a dominant estate under article 647. Adding to the confusion, 
there are rights that give personal advantages and conveniences which are 
deemed to benefit an estate rather than a person.157 Indeed, any benefit 
                                                                                                             
 154. See, e.g., Textron Fin. Corp. v. Retif Oil & Fuel LLC, 342 F. App’x 29, 
33 (5th Cir. 2009) (holding that the parties designated a burden in benefit of a 
person rather than a separate estate by the wording of their contract). 
 155. When the parties do not make their intentions clear, articles 732 through 
734 impose presumptions on the existence of predial servitudes according to the 
nature of the right created, whether it is of a nature “to confer an advantage on an 
estate,” or “for the convenience of a person.” LA. CIV. CODE arts. 733734. In the 
former case, under article 733, courts will presume the existence of a predial 
servitude even when the parties have not explicitly stated that the right exists for 
the benefit of an estate. Id. art. 733. In the latter case, under article 734, courts will 
not presume that an arrangement is a predial servitude unless the parties confirm 
that their arrangement is for the benefit of one person “as owner of an estate” and 
for that owner’s heirs and assigns. Id. art. 734. For examples of these articles in 
action, see Burgas v. Stoutz, 141 So. 67, 69 (La. 1932) (holding that an 
arrangement where the “purchaser has the privilege of using the paved driveway 
. . . which driveway is part of Lot B” created a predial servitude because use of 
the neighbor’s driveway would necessarily benefit an estate and raise its property 
values by freeing land to use for other purposes); Gillis v. Nelson, 16 La. Ann. 
275, 279 (La. 1861) (holding that an arrangement where one party was obliged to 
leave a levee on their property had created a predial servitude because it benefitted 
the dominant estate by blocking flood waters).  
 156. LA. CIV. CODE art. 647. 
 157. Id. art. 734 (establishing that some arrangements that convey a mere 
convenience to a person might be predial servitudes when the parties express that 
intention). One can argue that reading articles 647 and 734 together creates an 
apparent contradiction in the law. The language in article 734 suggests that when 
a right is granted merely for the convenience of a person it is considered to be a 
predial servitude as long as it is acquired by a person as owner of an estate for 
himself and his heirs and assigns. LA. CIV. CODE art. 734. Read in pari materia 
with article 647, a self-conflicting rule is created: predial servitudes, which by 




contained in a predial servitude is necessarily enjoyed by a person, the 
owner of a dominant estate, rather than the property; the attribution of the 
benefit to the estate is a mere fiction.158 Nevertheless, there must be a 
distinction between benefits that benefit an estate and those that do not; 
otherwise, the language of article 647 is superfluous,159 and predial 
                                                                                                             
their nature require a right that can reasonably be interpreted to benefit a dominant 
estate, will be presumed to exist when the right conveys a mere personal 
convenience as long as a person acquired it as owner of an estate for himself and 
for his heirs and assigns. The tension arises when trying to reconcile the need for 
rights that benefit an estate with the apparent validity of rights that merely 
convenience a person. Article 734, however, must be read in light of article 640, 
which establishes that only those rights conveyable through a predial servitude 
may be conveyed in a personal servitude; such a reading makes clear that article 
734 is simply a poorly phrased interpretation rule that helps courts classify rights 
that could equally benefit either a person or a dominant estate. Because the rights 
for personal servitudes could just as easily form predial servitudes, courts need a 
way to distinguish the intention of the parties when the contract is not explicitly 
labeled. Article 734 allows the court to question whether the parties intended their 
agreement to benefit an estate owner as a person or as the first in a long line of 
estate owners. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 20, § 1:9 (citing G. BALIS, CIVIL LAW 
PROPERTY 299 (3d ed. 1955) (in Greek)). “For example, a servitude in favor of a 
named owner of an estate for the enjoyment of a swimming pool or of a tennis 
court in another estate is a limited personal servitude.” Id. The Code of 1870 made 
this correct interpretation more apparent through examples:  
Thus for example, if the owner of a house near a garden or park, should 
stipulate for the right of walking and gathering fruits and flowers therein, 
this right would be considered personal to the individual, and not a 
servitude in favor of the house or its owner. . . . But the right becomes 
real and is a predial servitude, if the person stipulating for the servitude, 
acquires it as owner of the house, and for himself, his heirs and assigns. 
LA. CIV. CODE art. 757 (1870). The comments to article 734 indicate that the 
article was meant to replicate the substance of article 757. LA. CIV. CODE art. 734, 
cmt. a (2017). The main intended change in the legislation was to acknowledge 
that some arrangements in favor of a person might be personal servitudes, and not 
merely personal obligations, when there is no indication that they should be 
classified as predial servitudes. Id. art. 734, cmt. b. Though the language of the 
articles creates some initial confusion, there is no conflict between articles 647 
and 734, and there should be no doubt that a predial servitude truly does require 
a benefit to a dominant estate. It is not enough that a right might convenience a 
person who claims it as owner of an estate if the right in question cannot benefit 
a dominant estate, for such an arrangement will never create a predial servitude.  
 158. LA. CIV. CODE art. 646 cmt. c. 
 159. Article 646 already establishes that a predial servitude is a charge on a 
servient estate for the benefit of a dominant estate. Id. art. 646. If any charge on a 
servient estate might be written by the parties to favor a dominant estate, then 




servitudes might be established on the mere declaration of the parties 
involved.160 
Doctrine and jurisprudence make clear that article 647 is not wasted 
language. Professor Yiannopoulos has called article 647’s requirement the 
“principle of utility” because it describes a key feature of predial 
servitudes.161 The Louisiana Civil Code once contained language that 
made the principle of utility more explicit,162 and the Louisiana Supreme 
Court has enforced this element of predial servitudes since 1853 by 
invalidating predial servitudes that benefit only a person instead of an 
estate.163 Similarly, the Second Circuit has recognized the principle of 
                                                                                                             
there would be no need for the following language in article 647: “there is no 
predial servitude if the charge imposed cannot be reasonably expected to benefit 
the dominant estate.” Id. art 647. Article 647 would stand as mere superfluous 
repetition of article 646. This problematic reading is avoided, however, if some 
charges on a servient estate cannot benefit a dominant estate no matter the intent 
of the parties; for, if charges on servient estates can be divided into two groups—
those that can benefit a dominant estate and those that cannot—then article 647 
establishes that predial servitudes can only be formed from the former group no 
matter how intensely the parties insist that a charge in the latter group benefits a 
dominant estate.  
 160. The Louisiana Supreme Court has already noted that parties cannot create 
real rights merely by intention when the rights are not of the proper sort. Leonard 
v. Lavigne, 162 So. 2d 341, 342 (La. 1964) (stating that parties’ intention that a 
lease agreement run with the property against third parties is not enough to 
transform a lease into a real right). 
 161. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 20, § 1:9. 
 162. In 1949, at least, article 709 of the Civil Code provided in part: 
Owners have a right to establish on their estates, or in favor of their 
estates, such servitudes as they deem proper; provided, nevertheless, that 
the services be not imposed on the person or in favor of the person, but 
only on an estate or in favor of an estate; and provided, moreover, that 
such services, imply nothing contrary to public order. 
LA. CIV. CODE art. 709 (1949); Holloway v. Ransome, 43 So. 2d 673, 675 (La. 
1949). This older code article makes it clear that predial servitudes are limited to 
rights that burden and benefit estates rather than persons. The comments to article 
697 make clear that “this language has not been reproduced . . . because it is 
apparent from the definition and the essential features of predial servitudes.” LA. 
CIV. CODE art. 697 cmt. d (2017). Though the modern article is less explicit, the 
law is unchanged. Id. 
 163. See Parish v. Municipality No. 2, 8 La. Ann. 145, 149 (1853) (holding 
that a compromise agreement between parties whereby the state, as owner of 
property, agreed to leave open a section of land to the public and to refrain from 
building upon it was not a predial servitude because the benefit went toward the 




utility, albeit by analogy, by extinguishing a personal servitude of passage 
that had ceased to benefit a railroad that had shut down its rail line on the 
property.164 To apply the principle of utility against predial servitudes of 
noncompetition, courts must determine whether noncompetition benefits 
an estate or merely a person.165 
The comments to Louisiana Civil Code article 647 offer some 
guidance for interpreting the principle of utility and identifying which 
rights can be deemed to benefit an estate. The benefit must derive from the 
servient estate, not be attributed to a designated person, and must be 
attributed to the person who owns the dominant estate “at any given 
time.”166 For example, absent a designation of a particular person as 
beneficiary,167 a servitude for the maintenance of a bathroom is a predial 
servitude because it clearly benefits all future owners of the dominant 
estate who have access to that bathroom.168 It is immaterial that bathing is 
a personal habit because every future owner will benefit from this 
access.169 The same rule applies in servitudes for access to a swimming 
pool or tennis court on a servient estate.170 
The jurisprudential guidance defining a benefit to a dominant estate 
comes from the Louisiana Supreme Court itself, albeit in the form of a 
rather old case.171 In Parish v. Municipality No. 2, the Louisiana Supreme 
Court found that although the parties had correctly named a servient and 
dominant estate in an attempt to create a predial servitude, they had 
                                                                                                             
private, public-minded interests of the parties rather than toward the probable 
interests of all future owners of the parties’ estates). 
 164. Swayze v. State Dep’t of Transp. & Dev., 793 So. 2d 1278, 1280 (La. Ct. 
App 2001), writ denied, 808 So. 2d 342 (La. 2002). This case concerned a 
personal servitude acquired by a railroad, but the court applied article 647 by 
analogy. Id. This application is acceptable because article 645 establishes that 
personal servitudes are governed by predial servitude articles where applicable. 
The court found that the servitude had ceased to be useful for a railroad company 
that had closed off the rail line running through it; without a clear benefit to the 
beneficiary, the personal servitude was extinguished. Id. 
 165. LA. CIV. CODE art. 647. 
 166. Id. art. 647 cmt. c. 
 167. These same rights can just as easily be personal servitudes if the parties 
establish them for particular persons rather than for all future owners of an estate. 
Id. (citing Greco v. Frigerio, 3 La. App. 649, 651 (Orl. Cir. 1926)). 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Parish v. Municipality No. 2, 8 La. Ann. 145 (1853). 




selected a right that did not benefit the dominant estate.172 The parties 
agreed to a donation of land to the state with the provision that the land 
not be built upon, alienated, or denied to the public except under certain 
conditions.173 The donors’ successor-in-title tried to enforce the agreement 
as a predial servitude of view and access,174 but the Court determined that 
the actual intention behind the contract was to create a park and ensure 
public access for the gratification of the donors’ desire to “favor the 
public.”175 Because the benefit was one that accrued to these individual 
donors and would not apply in all cases to future owners of the dominant 
estate, who might be less philanthropically inclined than their 
predecessors, the Court determined that there was no predial servitude and 
held that the obligation was personal in nature.176  
In light of the comments to article 647 and the Court’s decision in 
Parish v. Municipality No. 2, the benefit to the dominant estate can be 
defined as follows: a benefit to the dominant estate derives from the 
servient estate, benefits any given owner of the dominant estate at any 
given time, and is not reliant on the particular whims or motives of that 
person.177 Under this definition, predial servitudes of noncompetition 
                                                                                                             
 172. Id. at 149 (holding that a compromise agreement between parties whereby 
the state, as owner of property, agreed to leave open a section of land to the public 
and to refrain from building most buildings upon it was not a predial servitude 
because the benefit went toward the private, public-minded interests of the parties 
rather than toward the probable interests of all future owners of the parties’ 
estates). 
 173. Id. at 146. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. at 149. The plaintiffs also claimed that the supposed servitude benefitted 
the dominant estate by raising its property value, but the Court quickly rejected this 
argument. Id. The Court was right to dismiss the argument because only those 
persons who owned the property during the one-time increase in value can profit 
from it. For all subsequent purchasers of the property, the increase in value is offset 
by the higher acquisition price they must pay.  
 177. This definition would classify access to a swimming pool as a valid 
predial servitude because any owner of a dominant estate, or at least any generic 
owner, could make beneficial use of the right. Even if one owner cannot swim or 
has no desire to do so, the activity is so common a form of leisure and exercise 
that it is reasonable to expect a randomly selected successor in ownership to be 
pleased with the servitude right rather than to react with indifference or disdain. 
The same goes for other rights: of drain because any given owner can be expected 
to detest flooding, of support because any given owner would appreciate a right 
that keeps his structure upright, and so on. On the other hand, a guarantee that the 




generally do not benefit the dominant estate and only benefit a particular 
business. 
2. Most Noncompetition Agreements Fail to Benefit the Dominant 
Estate 
In violation of article 647, predial servitudes of noncompetition tend 
not to create rights for all future owners of an estate, but instead for the 
specific person who operates a business on the dominant estate at the time 
the servitude is created.178 For example, consider an accounting firm with 
two office buildings on two estates. Suppose this firm sells one office 
building—the servient estate—on the condition that it not be used to 
provide accounting services in competition with the other office 
building—the dominant estate. A great variety of professionals might 
make use of office space, and it is a stretch to presume that any given 
owner of the dominant estate will provide accounting services and benefit 
from the noncompetition servitude as the seller did.179 The same analysis 
applies to small shops and retail locations: a baker gains nothing from an 
arrangement that prohibits his neighbors from operating floral shops, 
repairing bicycles, or selling electronics.180 
Most predial servitudes of noncompetition cannot be reasonably 
expected to benefit the owner of a dominant estate whomever it may be at 
any given time. In many noncompetition servitude arrangements, just as 
in the Parish public park dispute,181 parties attempt to attribute their 
personal business whims to their property and inappropriately presume 
that successors will share their needs and desires.182 A subsequent owner, 
who in theory might make a business out of a home or vice versa, is as 
likely to share his predecessor’s profession as he would share his 
philanthropic disposition.183 Therefore, these noncompetition agreements 
do not benefit the dominant estate as required under article 647.184 
                                                                                                             
public be permitted to picnic on the servient estate would not be a predial servitude 
because the benefit appeals to an owner’s personal philanthropy. 
 178. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 20, § 6:5. 
 179. See id. 
 180. See id. 
 181. See Parish, 8 La. Ann. at 149. 
 182. See YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 20, § 6:5. 
 183. See Parish, 8 La. Ann. at 149 (holding that because any given future 
owners of property could not be reasonably expected to derive philanthropic 
pleasure from the preservation of servient land as a public park, the obligation not 
to develop or build upon the land could not form a valid predial servitude). 
 184. See supra Part III.B.1. 




Because these rights of noncompetition cannot reasonably be expected 
to benefit a dominant estate, they cannot create valid predial servitudes. 
Louisiana courts have been too quick to acknowledge these rights and to bar 
properties from legitimate commercial activities. Against Louisiana’s strong 
public policy, property is being barred from commerce and ownership is 
being restricted. By failing to scrutinize these predial servitudes of 
noncompetition, Louisiana courts are acting against the very same public 
policy considerations they espouse in other cases. 
Professor Yiannopoulos has recognized this error and called for reform 
in Louisiana that would bar predial servitudes of noncompetition from being 
recognized.185 France, another civil law state, follows this approach and 
outright refuses to recognize predial servitudes of noncompetition because 
the benefit accrues to the owner of a particular establishment rather than the 
owner of an estate at any given time.186 However, an absolute bar to the 
enforcement of a real right of noncompetition would be an incorrect 
interpretation of Louisiana law. 
3. Certain Noncompetition Agreements Can Benefit the Dominant 
Estate 
An absolute bar to predial servitudes of noncompetition is too broad 
and heavy-handed because it ignores valid predial servitudes. There are 
circumstances under which a successor to property is almost certain to 
engage in the same profession as his predecessor.187 In this situation, a 
predial servitude of noncompetition should benefit any future owner in 
conformity with article 647. 
Consider a gas station, the construction of which requires extensive 
alteration to the property in the form of burying gas tanks and installing 
pumps in their distinctive rows. A future buyer could theoretically 
demolish the existing structures and build any new structures he desired, 
but it would be a costly endeavor to erase the improvements made by his 
predecessor. Rather, a person who purchases a gas station likely intends to 
make use of the improvements to operate the same sort of business as the 
property’s previous owner. This reasoning applies to many instances of 
developed property, such as movie theaters or oil refineries. 
Where any given future owner of the dominant estate is likely to 
engage in the same business as the contracting owner, a predial servitude 
of noncompetition benefits the dominant estate. The fifteenth owner of a 
                                                                                                             
 185. See YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 20, § 6:5. 
 186. Id. (citing 3 PLANIOL & RIPERT, TRAITÉ PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL 
FRANÇAIS 924 (2d ed. 1952)). 
 187. Id. 




gas station benefits as much from a servitude preventing neighboring 
estates from selling gasoline as much as the first owner of the gas station 
did. As long as there are extensive modifications to a property tailored to 
a particular industry, predial servitudes of noncompetition can be created 
under the Louisiana Civil Code.188 
Other civil law jurisdictions have recognized the validity of these 
special predial servitudes of noncompetition. Both Greek and German 
jurisprudence permit landowners to contract for predial servitudes of 
noncompetition when the dominant estate has been extensively modified 
to support a particular trade, but they do not allow these servitudes when 
the dominant estate can readily be used for other business activities.189 In 
these countries the owner of a manufacturing plant or a gas station, for 
example, will be able to contract with neighbors for predial servitudes of 
noncompetition because his property has been permanently dedicated to a 
single trade.190 
This compromise approach seems the most theoretically sound of the 
three options insofar as it recognizes predial servitudes of noncompetition 
only when a real benefit to a dominant estate is present. Importantly, this 
approach is not a suggestion for future law, but a more correct and full 
interpretation of the law as it currently stands; predial servitudes of 
noncompetition are necessarily restricted by the nature of predial 
servitudes. The current law, however, leaves unresolved policy concerns 
regarding noncompetition arrangements. A complete bar against predial 
servitudes of noncompetition is undesirable, but action should be taken to 
regulate these noncompetition contracts. 
                                                                                                             
 188. Recognition of this sort of predial servitude allows one to make sense of 
the language in Louisiana Civil Code article 699 that identifies a restriction on the 
raising of buildings as a valid predial servitude apart from the traditional predial 
servitudes of view and light. Where a business requires extensive modifications 
of land or the raising of structures to operate, a prohibition on these erections or 
modifications will necessarily bar the owner from engaging in that business. 
Whether this sort of trade exclusion was contemplated at the time the article was 
penned is impossible to determine, but it provides a satisfying explanation of how 
a restriction on the raising of buildings can benefit a dominant estate apart from 
ensuring access to view and light. 
 189. See YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 20, § 6:5. 
 190. Id. (citing Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] July 6, 
1939, 161 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES REICHSGERICHTS IN ZIVILSACHEN [RGZ] 90, 
1939 (Ger.)) (involving a prohibition of the operation of a power station in 
competition with the power station on the dominant estate). 




C. Public Policy Problems with the Predial Servitude of Noncompetition 
Businesses will enter into these noncompetition arrangements for a 
variety of reasons, some of which are perfectly legitimate and worth 
preserving in the law.191 It is also part of the modern legal spirit to allow 
                                                                                                             
 191. For example, Louisiana Revised Statutes section 23:921 contemplates 
restrictive covenants between partners in business, buyers and sellers of a 
business’s good will, employers and employees, and franchise owners and 
operators. Noncompetition arrangements protect against businesses’ legitimate 
fear that they will waste time and energy to train their competitors or their 
competitor’s employees or against the legitimate concern that previous owners 
might thwart the purchase of a brand by marketing themselves as the true 
successors to the brand and stealing customers away. In the context of land use 
restrictions, businesses have incentive to avoid selling assets or land to 
competitors or to those who will later sell or lease to competitors. Such was the 
case in R & K Bluebonnet, Inc. v. Patout’s of Baton Rouge, Inc. and Meadowcrest 
Center v. Tenet Health System Hospitals, Inc. R & K Bluebonnet, Inc. v. Patout’s 
of Baton Rouge, Inc., 521 So. 2d 634, 635 (La. Ct. App. 1988); Meadowcrest Ctr. 
v. Tenet Health Sys. Hosps., 902 So. 2d 512, 514 (La. Ct. App. 2005). It is possible 
that businesses will keep unused property out of commerce unless they have 
access to these noncompetition agreements as insurance in their sales. Just as 
reasonably, businesses have an interest in preserving a brand image after 
purchasing another business’s goodwill. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. § 23:921 (2017) 
(permitting certain noncompetition agreements in sales of a business’s goodwill). 
This interest likely motivated the arrangement in SPE FO Holdings, LLC v. Retif 
Oil & Fuel, LLC, No. 07-3779, 2008 WL 754716, at *1 (E.D. La. Mar. 19, 2008), 
wherein a buyer of assets sought assurance that the seller would allow the buyer 
to operate without competition from the seller’s remaining local estates. As in 
land sales, prohibitions against noncompetition agreements in sales of business 
assets could stifle legitimate and healthy business deals. On the other hand, 
businesses also have a strong interest in shaping markets for easy exploitation, 
and it is often in the public’s best interest to limit the extent to which businesses 
can pursue this goal. The interest in market manipulation is inherent to the very 
nature of a business as a revenue-generating activity, and the legal opposition to 
its unchecked pursuit can be observed in legislation, such as the Sherman Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 1 and the following, designed to thwart creation of monopolies by unfair 
trade practices. Agreements founded only on this exploitive, monopolistic interest 
run contrary to public policy and are often unrecognized by courts, at least in the 
common law. Dean Van Horn Consulting Assoc., Inc. v. Wold, 395 N.W. 2d 405, 
40809 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986); LA. REV. STAT. § 23:921. Care should always be 
taken to balance protections for healthy business interests and restrictions on 
unhealthy market manipulations.  




parties to contract as they see fit,192 and care should be taken to protect this 
freedom wherever possible. 
Barring predial servitudes of noncompetition could seriously impede 
the ability of companies to protect their interests. In the context of sales of 
land, where a business wishes to avoid selling excess property to a 
competitor, there is no effective contractual solution other than the predial 
servitude of noncompetition. The next best alternative for a business in 
this situation is to contract for a personal right of noncompetition, but these 
personal rights will not bind future owners or lessees on the property.193 
Because personal obligations lose their effectiveness after property is 
transferred or leased, they are inadequate insurance for a business looking 
to sell real estate without giving it to a competitor. Businesses purchasing 
assets from failing companies, as occurred in Retif, face similar problems 
because personal obligations imposed on a failing company are unlikely 
to survive the inevitable dispersal of assets.194 Therefore, Louisiana should 
not legislate to ban the predial servitude of noncompetition as France has 
done; doing so would remove a vital tool that businesses use to protect 
their interests.195 
However, there are good reasons to restrict predial servitudes of 
noncompetition.196 Noncompetition agreements pose threats to the public 
                                                                                                             
 192. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1971 (2017) (establishing that parties hold the freedom 
to contract for any object that is lawful, determinable, and possible). Notably, 
legislation will trump the freedom of contract, but it is clear that the default is a 
deference for the freedom of parties. Id. 
 193. See, e.g., Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Dolgencorp, LLC, 746 F.3d 1008, 
1031 (11th Cir. 2014). 
 194. See SPE FO Holdings, 2008 WL 754716, at *5 (denying summary 
judgment where a factual question existed as to whether the purchasers of 
property assumed a prior bankrupt owner’s obligation towards the plaintiff in a 
noncompetition personal obligation). 
 195. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 20, § 6.5. 
 196. The traditional concern is that employers can abuse noncompetition 
arrangements because employees who agree to the noncompetition are left bound 
to the business for their livelihoods. There are parallels between this employment 
by threat of contractually enforced unemployment and indentured servitude, 
which bound parties to work for another under penalty of prison sentences. Carey 
C. Lyon, Oppress the Employee: Louisiana’s Approach to Noncompetition 
Agreements, 61 LA. L. REV. 605, 609 (2001). These arrangements can indefinitely 
tie a person to a particular labor by threat of poverty. Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 
219, 244 (1911). The parties in an employment relationship burdened with such 
agreements are left in a severe power imbalance where an employee cannot afford 
to quit or be fired but the employer suffers no burden for discharging the 
employee. Carey C. Lyon, Oppress the Employee: Louisiana’s Approach to 




good by disrupting efficient markets and permitting the purchase of local 
monopolies. In an employment context, they can disrupt efficient labor 
markets by impeding the flow of labor to those parties to whom it would 
be most valuable.197 In the case of predial servitudes, the arrangement can 
disrupt efficient land use by preventing future owners from using an estate 
to its full potential.198 Even if the contracting owner of the servient estate 
never intended to use his land to compete with the dominant estate, the 
land becomes burdened for all future owners even if that is the best use of 
the property. Further, noncompetition agreements of all sorts offend 
traditional notions of fair competition in the market because they empower 
the wealthy to purchase monopolies either by tying up a local workforce199 
or, in the case of predial servitudes, a broad region of land.200 
                                                                                                             
Noncompetition Agreements, 61 LA. L. REV. 605, 61011 (2001). This inequity 
is especially problematic when employees might have little initial bargaining 
power, such as when the contract is a prerequisite to employment. The power 
imbalance that warrants regulation of noncompetition agreements between 
employer and employee does not carry over to predial servitudes of 
noncompetition. See Louisiana Smoked Prods., Inc. v. Savoie’s Sausage & Food 
Prods., Inc., 696 So. 2d 1373, 137881 (La. 1997) (holding that Louisiana’s law 
prohibiting noncompetition agreements does not affect agreements between 
businesses because, among other things, the businesses are not in the unequal 
bargaining positions that the statute was meant to provide for). Nevertheless, 
agreements not to use land for competition carry their own policy issues. 
 197. See Christopher T. Wonnell, The Contractual Disempowerment of Employees, 
46 STAN. L. REV. 87, 10002 (1993) (discussing the theory of “efficient breach”). 
Efficient breach is the idea that, economically speaking, employees should rationally 
breach contracts to work for employers willing to compensate them enough to 
overcome the costs of breach; this breach ensures that labor is distributed to those 
who consider it most valuable. Id. Noncompetition agreements prevent this 
economic shuffling by shutting down the employee’s freedom to move in the 
labor market. 
 198. C.f. Meadowcrest Ctr. v. Tenet Health Sys. Hosps., Inc., 902 So. 2d 512, 
515 (La. Ct. App. 2005) (arguing that a predial servitude does not impinge on 
public policy when it removes land from commerce because legislation has made 
these arrangements part of the public policy on land ownership). 
 199. Gerald T. Laurie & David A. Harbeck, Balancing Business Protection 
with Freedom to Work: A Review of Noncompete Agreements in Minnesota, 23 
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 107, 117 (1997).  
 200. Allowing parties free reign to craft predial servitudes of noncompetition 
would permit businesses to effectively purchase regional monopolies and tie up 
land that could have been developed for fair market competition. It is conceivable 
that a business might approach neighboring businesses, engage them in separate 
trades, and purchase the agreement that their estates never compete with its own. 
Because many of these neighbors likely have no desire to engage in that industry, 




Although the removal of the servient estate from commerce is cause 
for concern, the servient estate will not necessarily be bound forever. 
Predial servitudes are extinguished when the dominant estate is 
destroyed,201 when both estates are owned by the same individual,202 or 
when the dominant estate owner renounces the servitude in writing.203 
Predial servitudes are also extinguished once the benefit to the dominant 
estate ceases to exist, such as when the dominant estate ceases to be used 
for the trade protected by the servitude.204 
On the other hand, these methods of extinction are not guarantees of 
any reasonable deadline, and they are inadequate checks on predial 
servitudes of noncompetition. The servient estates burdened with these 
servitudes are removed from a particular trade or industry indefinitely and 
to the detriment of free market competition. In light of these concerns, 
Louisiana’s recognition of predial servitudes of noncompetition, even in 
limited circumstances of significant land alteration, should be restricted. 
Personal obligations of noncompetition between parties in certain business 
relationships are limited in duration and scope to prevent permanent loss 
                                                                                                             
they receive payment for effectively no personal costs. The outcome is complete 
control over local consumers because the land has been made worthless for 
potential competitors. The expenses might be prohibitive for most businesses, but 
the mere possibility that land could be tied up in this manner to benefit a single 
business is a cause for alarm. This outcome impinges on the Louisiana public 
policy in favor of free use of land as well as the American tradition of free-market 
competition. 
 201. LA. CIV. CODE art. 751 (2017). 
 202. Id. art. 765. 
 203. Id. art. 771. 
 204. Swayze v. State Dep’t of Transp. & Dev., 793 So. 2d 1278, 1280 (La. Ct. 
App. 2001), writ denied, 808 So. 2d 342 (La. 2002) (determining that a servitude 
for a right of passage ceased to benefit a railroad when it permanently shut down 
the rail line that passed through the servient estate; the end of benefits terminated 
the servitude). This case concerned a personal servitude acquired by a railroad, 
but the court applied article 647 by analogy. Id. The application of article 647 to 
this case was perfectly acceptable because article 645 establishes that personal 
servitudes are governed by predial servitude articles where applicable. Just as the 
railroad’s personal servitude expired with the railroad’s closure of the rail line, a 
predial servitude of noncompetition will expire when the dominant estate is 
entirely removed from the industry that was in place when the parties created the 
servitude. This expiration occurs because the current and future owners of the 
dominant estate will no longer extract any benefit from the arrangement once the 
trade or business is abandoned. See id. 




of livelihood;205 similar restrictions should be established for predial 
servitudes of noncompetition to prevent the permanent limitation of land. 
As things stand, Louisiana courts are misapplying the law of predial 
servitudes.206 Moreover, the more faithful interpretation of the law fails to 
address public policy concerns regarding abuse of predial servitudes to 
create monopolies and the potentially perpetual removal of property from 
commerce. Legislative action must be taken to address these problems. 
IV. A LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION 
Louisiana courts have been incorrect to zealously validate predial 
servitudes of noncompetition. The correct approach under the law is to 
permit predial servitudes of noncompetition when the dominant estate has 
been permanently altered and dedicated to a particular industry or trade.207 
Legislative action should be taken both to clarify the law on predial 
servitudes of noncompetition and to reasonably restrict these arrangements 
in the best interests of society. 
Legislative action should take care to balance the interests of businesses 
in receiving adequate insurance against competition with the interests of the 
public in avoiding monopolies and in having access to unburdened land. The 
Louisiana approach to traditional noncompetition agreements is to allow such 
arrangements only when there is a particular relationship between parties, 
when the arrangement is two years long or less, and when the geographic 
scope is limited.208 This approach provides a good model from which to create 
regulation for real rights of noncompetition. The legislation governing predial 
servitudes of noncompetition should place qualifiers on party relationships, 
duration of the servitude, and the specificity of the limitation. The legislature 
should also take this opportunity to correct court misapplication of the 
principle of utility in predial servitudes of noncompetition. To make this 
correction, the new legislation should include an explicit requirement that the 
dominant estate be permanently dedicated to a trade or business.209 
A. Prohibition of Freestanding Noncompetition Servitudes 
First, the legislature should permit predial servitudes of noncompetition 
only as incidental obligations in contracts for the sale of land or business 
assets. This rule will limit the number of properties that can be removed from 
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commerce while allowing businesses to protect themselves as they dispose 
of excess land or acquire business assets. Businesses, such as the hospital 
in Meadowcrest210 or the restaurant in R & K Bluebonnet,211 can sell their 
property with the assurance that they will not be immediately surrendering 
their land to new competition. Meanwhile, as occurred in Retif,212 
businesses that purchase assets from others in an attempt to enter new 
markets can negotiate concessions that the seller will not use nearby 
estates to smother the burgeoning business. These arrangements are 
already permitted as personal obligations,213 but validating them as predial 
servitudes allows the businesses to protect themselves against third-party 
future owners that would not otherwise be bound to the arrangement. 
It is crucial that the noncompetition arrangement be an incidental, 
rather than core component, of the contracts that establish them. This 
limitation prohibits businesses from creating monopolies as they might do 
if permitted to negotiate freely with their neighbors for predial servitudes 
of noncompetition.214 The need for this provision is clear when 
considering the ease with which a business might extract these servitudes 
from his neighbors outside an act of sale. What homeowner would hesitate 
to accept money for the promise that his home never be a gas station? What 
grocer would turn down a cash windfall for the promise not to become an 
auto repair shop? It is in the public interest to prevent this abuse while 
preserving the business interests associated with sales of land and business 
assets. 
B. Limited Duration of the Servitude 
Second, the legislature should limit the duration of predial servitudes 
of noncompetition by establishing a maximum enforceable term. The term 
must be long enough to be meaningful and to protect the interests behind 
the arrangement, but the term must also be brief enough to ensure that 
property is returned to free commercial use in a reasonable time. The exact 
term to be set should be investigated thoroughly with input from business 
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owners.215 The term might also vary between contracts for the sale of real 
estate and the sale of ordinary assets because the business interests are 
different in these cases.216 
The two-year statutory term for personal obligations of noncompetition217 
is likely too short for meaningful predial servitudes. The appeal of real rights 
is that they automatically bind future owners;218 so the term should be long 
enough to see the property change hands. Ten years seems a satisfactory 
maximum because it allows a business ample opportunity to enjoy its 
purchase but returns property to commerce in less than a single generation.219 
A term approaching several decades seems excessive as successive parties 
who had no hand in the original contract and who might have been yet unborn 
at its inception would nevertheless find themselves barred from free 
commercial use of their land. 
C. Specificity of Prohibited Trade: No General Noncompetition 
Agreements 
Third, the legislature should require these arrangements be written to 
prohibit participation in particular industries or trades rather than to 
prohibit generic “competition” with the dominant estate. A predial 
servitude of noncompetition will cease to benefit the dominant estate once 
the trade-specific improvements are removed from the dominant estate,220 
and the predial servitude will necessarily expire with the loss of the benefit 
                                                                                                             
 215. This demographic has the greatest interest both in securing long-term 
protections for their business transactions and in preserving their right to freely 
leverage property for commerce. Therefore, recommendations from entrepreneurs 
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 216. Respectively, the interests are in avoiding the creation of competition 
when selling land and in purchasing time to establish a business in an area 
formerly occupied by the seller of the assets. In one case the dominant-estate 
holders want assurance that they can sell their excess property without creating 
difficulty for their businesses. In the other, the dominant-estate holders want 
assurance that they will not be cheated by the seller, who likely retains valuable 
customer contacts and market information for the area, all of which could be used 
to steal back business from the buyer. 
 217. LA. REV. STAT. § 23:921 (2017). 
 218. See supra Part I. 
 219. This suggested duration is based entirely on speculation. The term set by 
the legislature could be longer or shorter, and it should be set after thoughtful 
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 220. See supra Part III.B.3. 




to the dominant estate.221 Absent proactive legislation, however, a 
dominant estate owner might simply swap out the modifications on the 
dominant estate and attempt to pursue a new trade while enforcing the old, 
broadly worded servitude of noncompetition.222 If such retooling of a 
dominant estate occurs, Louisiana courts might recognize that the period 
between the old and new modifications to the dominant estate left the 
dominant estate without benefit from the predial servitude and caused the 
servitude to collapse, but there is a risk that the courts would hold that the 
new construction merely altered the nature of the servitude and the 
restriction on the servient estate. The latter outcome is not only legally 
questionable but also unreasonable to the servient estate owner who might 
be forced out of a particular business that was once permitted under his 
servitude contract. Certainly, there is no harm in making an explicit rule 
to remove future ambiguity or abuse of the law. 
D. Clarification of Current Law 
Finally, the legislature should take the opportunity to clarify the law 
of predial servitudes in Louisiana by explicitly including a requirement 
that the dominant estate be permanently dedicated to a particular trade or 
business. Louisiana courts have misinterpreted the law of predial 
servitudes because they have not scrutinized predial servitudes of 
noncompetition for benefits to the dominant estate. Because these benefits 
can only exist when any future owner of the dominant estate is likely to be 
committed to the same trade as his predecessors, the law as it stands today 
can support predial servitudes of noncompetition only when the dominant 
estate has been modified in a way that dedicates it to a particular trade. 
Adding this requirement to the legislation should not change the law in 
theory, but it will affect a change in legal practice because courts so far 
have ignored the law on this issue. 
Application of this rule will require factual determinations concerning 
the permanent dedication of land. In at least one German case, for 
example, the existence of a predial servitude depended heavily upon 
whether a bakery was fully equipped and likely to be used as a bakery by 
future owners or else was left generic enough to be used for other 
industry.223 This factor places new burdens on the Louisiana courts, which 
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will need to examine carefully the material developments on lands subject 
to potential predial servitudes. Parties will also be burdened by some 
uncertainty regarding their own estates, but this uncertainty should fade as 
jurisprudential tests and guidelines are developed. 
Arguably, the French approach—complete rejection of any predial 
servitude of noncompetition—is preferable for the simplicity it offers 
courts and parties. However, factual determinations are already a key part 
of Louisiana property law,224 and this hurdle should not be insurmountable 
for Louisiana courts.225 Subjective evaluations of property work perfectly 
well in Louisiana, and the courts will likely develop factor tests to decrease 
uncertainty in contracts. Moreover, the French approach sacrifices all of 
the benefits that regulated predial servitudes of noncompetition can bring 
as insurance in sales of real estate and business assets.  
E. The Proposed Legislation 
This act should be placed in the Revised Statutes rather than the Civil 
Code, primarily because of the specificity of the new law. An approximate 
model of the statute could be summarized thusly: 
A. All predial servitudes that purport to restrain the servient estate 
from participation in a trade or business in competition with the 
dominant estate shall be considered absolutely null unless they 
fulfill all of the criteria in Section B of this statute. 
B. Predial servitudes in restriction of trade shall be permitted when: 
(1) the servitude is made between buyers and sellers of land or 
business assets; (2) the servitude is subject to a resolutory term no 
greater than ten years; (3) the trade or business of the dominant 
estate from which the servient is to refrain is specifically described 
in the contract; and (4) the dominant estate has been permanently 
dedicated to a particular trade or business, such as a railroad station, 
gas station, or refinery. 
C. For purposes of Section B, a land has been permanently 
dedicated to a particular trade or business when, because of 
modifications or improvements to the property, it is more likely 
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than not that a randomly selected future owner will have 
purchased the land to practice the same trade or business as a 
randomly selected prior owner since the time of the dedication. 
By adopting this legislation, Louisiana will protect the public interest 
while continuing to recognize predial servitudes of noncompetition that 
offer a genuine benefit to their dominant estates. This legislation is the 
ideal solution that protects business interests, the integrity of the civil law, 
and the public welfare in the state. It will also remove remaining ambiguity 
regarding predial servitudes of noncompetition in the state.226 
Of course, if businesses wish to create noncompetition arrangements 
outside the new legislation, they are free to do so. These arrangements will 
simply create personal obligations, just as the arrangement in Retif did.227 
The contract will not be binding on the future owners of an estate, but it 
will be binding on the parties to the contract. These personal obligations 
should be enough to satisfy business interests in some situations, and it 
reflects what Louisiana has already done with noncompetition clauses 
embedded in lease agreements.228 
CONCLUSION 
Louisiana courts have been overzealously validating real rights of 
noncompetition in the form of predial servitudes. The law as written does 
permit predial servitudes of noncompetition, but only when the dominant 
estate is so modified and improved to suit a particular trade that a randomly 
selected future owner will likely be engaged in the same business as the owner 
who contracted for the servitude. Unfortunately, unregulated validation of 
even those servitudes that the law currently permits will introduce public 
policy concerns because businesses can abuse the law to purchase 
monopolies. The ideal solution is to clarify the law for courts while also 
regulating predial servitudes of noncompetition through legislation so that 
businesses can pursue legitimate interests without creating the risk of local 
monopolies. 
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Adoption of this legislative solution will mean that certain businesses, 
those that do not require extensive modification of the land to operate, will 
be rightfully unable to pursue real rights of noncompetition where once a 
Louisiana court might have permitted it. However, the law does not leave 
these businesses totally without remedy; all businesses can contract for 
personal obligations that restrict particular persons from using land in 
competition with their businesses. Real rights of noncompetition will 
remain the exceptions to public policy that Louisiana has always 
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